What rational reason would there be for assigning property rights to non-material objects that can seemingly be easily and cheaply shared by all if there were no legal regime governing intellectual property?

In other words, what distinguishes acceptable and unacceptable intellectual property rights , a question often asked when talking about AI.

There are deontological and utilitarian economic foundations on which to build intellectual property rights[1], but like the major schools of legal philosophy to which they belong, they do not answer, for example, the question of who should own the intellectual property developed by AI and why.

Therefore, I would like to disregard for a moment everything that is taught in the field of intellectual property or legal philosophy on these questions and try to take a different approach, such as an anthropological one, following the historian, literary scholar, anthropologist, and philosopher René Girard (1923-2015). I will return to intellectual property and artificial intelligence later to see if this is a solid basis on which to discuss intellectual property law and to find new answers.

To this end, I must outline Girard’s theories of human behavior, violence, and the scapegoat to provide a rational structure with which to build an argument to explain and uphold Law and Intellectual Property.

In short, law uses legal force to combat illegal force (e.g., theft, fraud, misinterpretation, etc.). This legally enforced and controlled violence is used by the government to uphold prohibitions and perform rites (considered legal institutions) that curb illegal human violence (defined by law) that would otherwise escalate and threaten the social fabric.

By violence, we mean -in more general and not necessarily legal language- active violence (e.g., that which is necessary to conquer something or to prevent conquest) and passive violence (the failure to do something in order to avoid falling into violence out of fear or depression), which would be an obstacle to any immaterial creation.

The problem of distinguishing between legal and illegal violence is the same problem that archaic civilizations faced when trying to distinguish sacrifice from murder or good blood from bad blood, a crisis of distinction brilliantly depicted in the various tragedies of Esquilo, Sophocles, and Euripides and further analyzed by Heraclitus[2].

Could we be facing a similar crisis of distinction between legal and illegal violence that is plunging our legal systems into crisis? What would be the legality by which we could deem some intellectual property rights acceptable without triggering a crisis of distinction as in archaic civilizations?

To better understand what we are talking about, we need to look at Girard’s theories.

2. Mimesis

One of the cornerstones of Girard’s theory is mimesis[3].

Girard says that humans are primarily dominated by desire, but this desire is not primordial, as the Romantics thought in the 19th century, but derived from others who serve as models (parents, siblings, friends, idols, etc.)[4]

Mimesis is not necessarily a conscious imitation of the desire of others. Modern public relations is based on it, if we interpret the theory around Propanda or Public Relations according to Barnays[5]. Moreover, the discovery of Mirror Neurons[6] confirms to some extent Girard’s hypothesis on mimesis.

All animals are mimetic[7] to some degree, but their instinct, which is almost absent in contemporary humans (which we might instead call appetite rather than instinct to distinguish it from desire), usually[8] acts as an obstacle to many human mimetic consequences -for example, challenging the privileges of dominant males[9].

Another insight is that desire is not a straight line between a subject and its object, as assumed by romantics, but a triangle in which a mediator indicates the object to be desired by the subject[10].

This mediator can be internal or external, depending on the possibility of the subject of desire to enter into rivalry with him for the same object of desire.

Girard discovered all this by reading and studying classical novelists such as Proust, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, and Flaubert[11]. These authors, who mastered their art, made their novels human and real, even when they introduced fictional characters -as in the case of Cervantes and Shakespeare-to materialize an external mediator.

We see the external mediator in the person of Amadis de Gaula, in Don Quixote[12], and in the gnomes and witches who appear frequently in Shakespeare’s tragedies.

The concept of the internal mediator would be a rational explanation for why we feel more comfortable working in groups or teams where this internal mediator always exists and is close to us. This does not mean that there can also be an external mediator for the group that conflicts with the internal one, or that loneliness proves that there can be no mediator, since such an external mediator can only exist in the mind – even if it is thought of as coming from the outside to make the wish come true.

However, the difference is not always physical, but in status. Children see internal mediators in peers and external mediators in adults with whom they cannot compete.

Children are also the best candidates for mimesis because they have not yet built strong mimetic structures that could block new mimetic desires from others, as adults have already achieved[13].

Adults are no less mimetic, but they have already built up their symbolic mimetic structures of desire, which might be compared to internalized language structures that keep us from making big mistakes, although they allow some stretch for change.

This is why it is so easy for a baby to learn a language (Arabic or Chinese, for example), while it is so difficult for adults to learn it if it is not related to their native language. Acquired language structures, just like acquired desire structures learned through mimesis, are an obstacle to the desires expressed by others for adults.

Of course, we can reform or rebuild our consolidated desire structures as long as we learn to be compliant to new desires we seek or adopt, even unconsciously, by letting mimesis make new changes to the desires we are taught through models (which is the basis of psychological analysis, coaching, management, propaganda, advertising, and, why not, religious proselytizing).

It is not surprising that children behave like their parents, siblings or friends, and even adults behave like their peers according to fashion or local culture.

Since desire determines our hope for pleasure or happiness, mimesis must be seen as the cause of so many broken hopes or bad decisions when the object of desire is not achieved as planned.

We borrow desire from others, so we borrow hope from them, and we need others to feed those hopes with desire, because that is the basis for behaving socially-not necessarily rationally.

Freedom must be sought not in the possibility of desire (which is always somehow unconsciously borrowed and absorbed), but in the possibility of choosing the models whose desire we naturally borrow while letting mimesis do its work. This is why dictatorship is opposed to freedom, even though it does not suppress desire. It only dictates what is to be desired, if it is properly planned and executed (brainwashing).

3. Rivalry

Mimesis is the first step to rivalry. IP, according to this theory now presented, would try to prevent rivalry by considering mimesis (or copying) illegal under certain conditions. We find a first hint of a new basis for IP regulations: avoid the escalation of violence by forbidding mimesis…

Rivalry is a logical path. If the mediator specifies the object that the subject desires, and this object is characterized by the fact that it cannot be shared (fame, top position, boss, advantages in IP rights, etc.), the mediator will desire it more, since it is additionally specified by the subject through his borrowed desire, which starts the competition and then the rivalry. This will not happen with an external mediator whose distance from the subject (due to status, age, ontology, etc.) does not allow rivalry.[14]

Therefore, contrary to common knowledge, the elimination of differences strengthens competition and facilitates rivalry rather than hindering it[15].

In an internal mediation, the mediator sends a paradoxical message to the subject who borrows his desire by saying, “Copy my desire,” while at the same time saying, “But do not take away the object of my desire,” and since the object cannot always be shared, as mentioned earlier, competition for the same object will begin and escalate to conflict through rivalry, unless prohibitions or rites enter the scene.

We can observe in every job people struggling to rise by copying their superiors, while the latter, although teaching their subordinates to improve, put obstacles so that they cannot reach them and take away their position. The human resources staff in these companies, if there are any, must find ways (rites and prohibitions usually known as protocols) to promote competition without rivalry.

Each subject becomes an intermediary for the intermediary, as it shows the intermediary how correct they are in stating what they want.

This will not happen with an external intermediary who cannot rival the subject because of distance. But if the intermediary is internal and there are no prohibitions or rites, the conflict is inevitable.

4. Conflict

If there are neither prohibitions nor rites that could divert desire from the same object that the mediator specifies, the two will bind together in what is called a double bind[16].

They postpone the desire for the object (which never existed, since it was placed by the mediator’s desire and therefore is symbolic), while replacing it with a new object: this is overcoming and eliminating the rival by all means at their disposal, when there are no (legal or cultural) prohibitions.

Someone may remark that since IP objects are divisible, there can be no rivalry. That is true. But then remember what was said about passive violence, which can also escalate. Passive violence is anxiety and depression that occurs when a desired object is not achieved. If an investor cannot get his investment back because everyone is sharing his invention object for free, he will stop investing out of fear, and if there is no way back, he will be depressed. Society will also fall into depression because no one will want to create objects that are already desired, even though –paradoxically- there are individuals with competent knowledge who can do so.

But let us stay with the double bind explanation to understand Girard’s theory.

Many examples can be found in real life. Couples who begin to fight for their children would finish the fight if a symbolic obstacle that cannot be overcome (the culture or the law with its rites and prohibitions) did not dissuade them from their new desire to destroy the other, or create a distance that makes it impossible for them to fulfill it (court cases, prohibitions, criminal sanctions, fear of sanctions).

This double dichotomy is also evident in boxing matches and all other sports practiced by two people, where rites and prohibitions limit to some extent the risk of injury, while at the same time they encourage any permitted differentiation (training, technique, surprise, speed, etc.), which will be copied by the rival sooner rather than later, when this in turn, is allowed, which are the benefits of competition.

The longer rivals try to differentiate, the longer they mimic themselves, which makes it difficult to finish the game by defeating the other[17]. When differentiation becomes difficult, rites must play a role in determining the winner (e.g., ending the soccer world cup by penalty shootout, limited number of contests to determine the winner, time, etc.)

If there were no rules (rites or prohibitions established by law or culture), rivalry would escalate into violence until both meet death, whether from exhaustion or injury, without any significant difference that could bring victory to one side over the other[18]. Competition is something dynamic, as shown in Tragedy and observed in the modern world.

Nevertheless, it is not only the establishment of rules (rites) or prohibitions that can prevent an escalation of violence in a society. It is a wise and prudent determination in every detail, which becomes more complex and should be developed as the society becomes more symbolic like our modern society.

If differences do not emerge in time and there are no accepted rites or prohibitions that can develop to avoid the annihilation of rivals, the crisis would grow socially and a scapegoat[19] will be needed.

5. The Scapegoat

Scapegoats were a great discovery of archaic social groups. They were the solution to divert violence to a single person or group while saving society from its self-destruction through rivalry because of no differentiation.

In the double-bind situation, competitors mimic each other in such a way that it is difficult for one to differentiate from the other and thus win. Because they are bound together by crossed desires, they feed off each other’s desires and mimic each other while trying to distinguish themselves from each other (the usual paradox of tragedy). When, in this search for mimesis and differentiation, another, third desire enters the double bond, it may lead part of its focus outward to break the equilibrium that the rivals hold in paroxysm and transform their mimetic desire in paroxysm into another object[20] .

The physical equilibrium of the double bond, while strong, is always unstable (we have already mentioned that victory constantly fluctuated from one side to the other and it always took rites to determine a winner), so any disruptive force concentrated outside the rivals, no matter how weak, can unbalance the forces of the double bond and transform them, while still bound, into another object of mimetic desire. Umpires hold that role in matches.

As long as the umpire keeps the authority (leader), he can enforce the rites and prohibitions, but if he loses it (which usually happens when the game is over or in a big crisis), he is usually blamed by the mob and even by some players for the loss of a team or a player, and if there were no laws and restrictions, he could be symbolically “killed” by the mob as a scapegoat as would happen to a King (see below).

The scapegoat, who is this third party alien to the double bind, can manage the situation as long as he is respected, but he gets all the blame once he loses power. That is why Kings are considered scapegoats whose death sentence is considered to be only postponed.

Scapegoats must somehow be different from the society that embraces the double -bind paroxysm, yet similar to enable the binding connection[21]. For this reason, in archaic civilizations, disabled people, children, women, strangers, and even pets were usually used as scapegoats. Kings, as said, are not exceptions, and their difference lies in their virtues or exceptions[22] rather than in their faults[23].

All existing double binds would mimetically direct their violence -while still in paroxysm- to the scapegoat following a wish of a third party who leads them all even when done unconsciously[24].

Since scapegoats must absorb violence without the risk of revenge, only people who have no ties to stronger or more influential people or animals can serve as scapegoats. Kings, though powerful, can lose this power and be killed as scapegoats by the mob after enjoying a holy life.

Children and women, even if they are weak and do not face retribution, may still have strong political or social ties and therefore not qualify as scapegoats[25].

Scapegoats do not really have to be guilty of anything. All that matters is that the mob deems them guilty and worthy of the violence they have earned from the mob[26].

After their extermination, which in archaic societies meant execution, stoning, burning, etc. -while in modern life it is symbolic (imprisonment, press, dismissal, deportation) – society recovers its peace, which in ancient times was considered a gift of the scapegoat and therefore it was deified.

Today, in our symbolic world, we no longer deify the scapegoat, but we do so with the means or persons that symbolically destroy it (speech, press, justice, prison, judges, police).

6. Myths

Violence as mimesis would have remained unconscious to humans had it not been for alien observers outside the mimetic paroxysm, supported by nature.

Since violence is a consequence of mimesis, no observer from within could be safe from the mimetic paroxysm and therefore be objective. Here nature played its complementary role in the discovery of human violence, for which a third responsible subject was needed.

Nature, like a Rorschach test, would reflect the inner thoughts of an observer who experienced violence paroxysms.

Thus, nature served as a mirror for human violence. However, a fictive subjectivity was required to understand unconscious human violence.

This fictitious subjectivity supernatural and omnipotent, if it was to control nature, should also be human-like, since it was violent and, just like humans, needed victims to calm the chaos it unleashed.

This subjectivity could be only one god or many of them – powerful, though similar to men -.

According to this fiction, which can also be observed in a mentally ill person who always blames a third person, it was the gods who controlled nature, were violent and needed sacrifices, which they demanded in advance, and were responsible for the sacrifices (good violence) of men, otherwise chaos would ensue.

Humans, like any patient, considered themselves innocent of these sacrifices (good blood), since they were only obedient to the gods.

Good violence now became sacred and had to be applied through sacrifice to prevent the wrath of the gods while anthropologically it should have been previous to religion. Violence was now a sacred mandate that could not be confused with profane or bad violence.

7. Rites and Prohibitions

When the sacred was introduced into the game of violence, it was necessary to distinguish between good and bad violence. Therefore, rites and prohibitions became means to deal with the orders supposedly inspired by this fictious gods. The same thing is happening today. Laws inspired by the political leaders (gods) decide what is legal and what is illegal – what must be fought by the priests (judges) and their assistants (police)[27] with good force (law) -.

We can see archaic religious laws in the Law of Talia, which establishes a duty of vengeance (rite), and again in the Ten Commandments, which establish prohibitions to avoid violence. The latter show a regressive prohibition from serious crimes (Thou shalt not kill) to milder behaviors to be avoided to prevent the escalation of violence through mimesis. (Do not covet your neighbor’s goods) -and thus avoid the risk of escalation of violence through mimesis-[28].

Violence could thus be sacred (good) or profane (bad), depending on whether it was believed to reduce (good) or escalate (bad) violence in a society.

In archaic cultures, the rite of sacrifice was always practiced on subjects who could not retaliate, including animals, to calm violence by scarifying victims who posed no threat to the escalation of violence. Guilt undoubtedly played no role in the choice of scapegoats.

In the modern world, the presumed guilty are accused and condemned -if the accusations can be proven – so that the last word on revenge against those responsible has been spoken and no one is in a position to retaliate.

The essence is the same, which is to inflict violence on a scapegoat in order to appease society, while the consequences are handled differently and the punishment is not prescribed so arbitrarily, since the scapegoat is supposedly the main link -or responsible- in the crime on which retribution is to be inflicted.

8. The Law

As mentioned earlier, the law can also be considered the secular continuation of religion, i.e., it is sacred and therefore must be respected and is above everyone. Therefore, just like archaic religion, the law serves to avoid an escalation of violence that would otherwise endanger the social fabric[29].

It is again analogous to archaic religion when we see that those who ask for sacrifices are modern secular gods (the state), with omnipotent power represented by their priests (judges).

Its justification is constantly sought and guarded by secular theologians (jurists), while practiced by these priests (judges) who serve to pacify social violence through legal state violence in a way that serves to avoid or dissolve that social violence through rites so that it becomes weaker or harmless.

But the Law – just like archaic religions with their sacrificial rites and prohibitions – must find a rationale that helps it distinguish from illegal violence (bad blood). Failure to find a rationale threatens a crisis of non-distinction between legal and illegal, as we see in the discussion of acceptable and unacceptable intellectual property rights.

The three great Philosophical schools, because of their dogmatism (natural law), their formality but immateriality (positive law), or their ideological basis (critical law), have not arrived at an argument that is not relative and could help us.

9. The concept of morality and law in this theory.

As mentioned above, the justification of law cannot be based on a simple formal argument (positive law), a dogmatic one (natural law), or an ideological one (critical law) -as was the case with victims in archaic societies- if the crisis of undistinction is to be avoided.

If religion and law are to avoid the escalation of violence, they must not risk falling into a crisis of differentiation.

To this end, the notion of morality must be considered.

We would distinguish law from morality in that the former is related to power and the latter to will. In their ultimate goal, both seek to calm violence, but law would be content to avoid escalation (evidence of this is that there is a Law of War), while morality seeks complete peace.

Thus, law needs power to be upheld, while morality needs only personal will. Thus, a moral law would not necessarily need to be enforced by force and would be willingly obeyed if people understood its purpose or had serious faith in its government who would not deceive them.

For this reason, it is possible to act under the pressure set by the law and avoid the escalation of violence sought by the law, but once the pressure has be released or can no longer be increased if needed, people will begin behaving as they truly believe, which has to do with the moral they believe in.

If there is a moral path to peace (and there is according to Girard´s rational[30]), it must be sought and taught, and that should be sought by law.

Remember that morality need not be enforced by legal means, while law need not be moral. They are different from each other.

Both tend to appease violence, but morality seeks its goal in complete peace, since it needs to be self-imposed and respected by everyone, rather than imposed and feared.

For this reason, the law can be immoral. It may prevent an escalation of violence, but it must eventually be enforced by violence, because sooner rather than later, people will do what they think is moral.

Following this train of thought, the Aztec sacrifices were legal (since they prevented the escalation of violence in Tenochtitlan) but not moral (since they did not bring peace to that society), which needed each day more sacrifices while heading to a sacrificial crisis same as the one described by the Greeks in Tragedy and commented on by Heraclitus.

Therefore, according to Girard’s theory, the Ten Commandments could be considered a great scientific -more than religious- discovery that prevents an escalation of violence while bringing peace to a society when fully observed. This is because their legality is supported by morality when we analyze their rationale through the theory of mimesis and rivalry.

Talien’s law, on the other hand, only sought to avoid the escalation of violence, since revenge never brings peace because it carries the risk of more revenge through mimesis.

The full understanding of the Ten Commandments was brought by Christ when he summarized them in just two. You shall Love God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength, and you shall love your neighbor as yourself. This was the way to peace, which, moreover, would avoid the escalation of violence and whose imitation would transform human behavior into a virtuous circle.

The teachings of Crist served as an eye-opener regarding violence and the unique way to combat it: prudently, wisely, and avoiding violence, even at the cost of losing one’s life, in order to gain resurrection and eternal life as a result. His teachings had been imitated by many and were the origin of Hospitals, Universities, ONG, pardon and the belief that we are all free and equal while needing to fraternize – goals that were never achieved by the French Revolution since it was violent.

This does not mean that violence should not be used, instead it must be used wisely if we are not to enter into a crisis in which we can no longer distinguish legal violence from illegal, just as archaic civilizations could not distinguish between sacrifice (good blood) and murder (bad blood).

10. Property and Intellectual Property

We have made a rigorous summary of Girard’s theory -with some interpretations that we consider appropriate. His theory needs further elaboration, but this summary may be sufficient to understand Property in general and intellectual property rights with this different theoretical approach.

Property rights would be nothing more than a combination of rites and prohibitions to allocate goods to prevent the escalation of violence in a social fabric that does not yet have an understanding of it nor of the rites and prohibitions being exercised. Natural rights should not be sought as the basis of law. Law is only a symbolic instrument used through rites and prohibitions to prevent strife, fear or depression.

As said, the law (shaped by rites and prohibitions) is the inheritor of archaic religions whose purpose is to prevent the escalation of active or passive violence.

The legal violence exercised by the Government is intended to prevent such escalation of violence (through violence enforced by rites or prohibitions).

However, just as in archaic religions, if law is not based on an objective parameter (say moral), there is a danger of a crisis of indistinction between legality and illegality, and the violence that initially manifests itself in fear or pessimism (because the Law should be obeyed even when no rationale exists) will eventually explode into active violence that can escalate to infinity.

What makes an act legal? Only the law? Any law then makes something legal or illegal?

Such an assertion is reminiscent of the distinction between good and bad blood criticized by Heraclitus, in which legal and illegal violence are reflected.

Intellectual property and intangibles could be the cause of violence (passive or active) weather they are acceptable or not as property.

It is the avoidance of the escalation of violence that should be considered as the true legal argument in support of the rationality of intellectual property, not any deontological or utilitarian theories. Of course, it is a dynamic and challenging way to achieve the only and true goal: social peace.

It depends on different issues such as: the development of society – IP was possible only when society developed its symbolism to make immaterial objects seemingly real -, the education that people have acquired, and the needs of society that arise from particular circumstances all that has to be considered and weighed by lawmakers.

We must realize, however, that according to this theory, the great step of law -from preventing the escalation of violence to pacification- must still be achieved and this will happen when Law finds its way in a moral framework, i.e., public consent based on rational comprehension or faith without deceit.

Thus, a proper response for regulating AI is not simple but challenging.

Many things should be considered when enacting such regulations.

However, one thing to strive for, as said, is to avoid active or passive escalation of violence, which endangers the social fabric.

If it is active violence, we will see people challenging and ignoring IP rights by all means on one side while arbitrary IP right holders trying to them on the other.

If it is passive violence, we will not see immaterial developers. Fear of losing investments or depression for no safe haven will hinder any such development.

We know we have not given a clear answer, only a direction, but the only one to follow to create new IP, abandon or modify others, and preserve the rest. The answer is dynamic and challenging as said, and must be sometimes related to each culture. Only specialists, if they accept this theory, can make the best case for a dynamic balance between active and passive violence so that neither escalates while society preserves its hope on achieving complete peace.

As human beings, we still need to learn to execute the deepest concepts of morality, undoubtedly taught by Christ 2000 years ago and explained scientifically by Girard’s theory.

As lawyers, only hard study with a focus on specialization can give us the tools to find the best ways to navigate the stormy waters between active and passive violence on the path to complete peace, which, like a boat, must be constantly monitored and sailed to prevent it from falling from the right course while winds and currents change.

Of course, the best thing would be to be in peace, but such a goal is only possible without violence, and law without violence can only be achieved through morality, that is, the public acceptance of law by rational or faith with no possibility of deceit.

11. Conclusions

We have rigorously summarized Girard’s theory of mimesis, rivalry, and the Scapegoat in order to find a rational response to Law and Morality.

If our reasoning is not wrong, Law is the continuation of Religion to prevent the escalation of violence in a society.

Therefore, the Law must balance active and passive violence so that it does not escalate and get out of control.

Of course, peace is the goal, but peace is contrary to violence, weather to avoid the escalation of violence or to achieve peace. Therefore, peace is a perfection difficult to achieve since violence disrupts it.

In the meantime, with intelligence and patience, we must not only find ways to avoid the escalation of violence, but always try to use less violence to control violence and therefore seek to someday achieve peace[31].

Intellectual property should be a strong ally in the process of pacifying society, through the legal institutions already known and many others yet to be discovered, modified or even abandoned.

  1. Taylor, Tim, and Estelle Derclaye, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Well-Being: A Methodological Approach’, in Irene Calboli, and Maria Lillà Montagnani (eds), Handbook of Intellectual Property Research: Lenses, Methods, and Perspectives (Oxford, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 Sept. 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826743.003.0042 , accessed 24 Feb. 2023. ↑

  2. Girard, R. (2005). Violence and the Sacred. London New York: Continuum, pages 41 and ss.. ↑

  3. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York. p. 33. https://archive.org/details/girardreader0000gira/page/10/mode/2up [accessed 2023 Feb 22] ↑

  4. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York. pp. 89/93. In this sense the post by Garrell, Scott: Imitation, Mirror Neurons, and Mimetic Desire: Convergence Between the Mimetic Theory of René Girard and Empirical Research on Imitation – in https://mimetictheory.com/mimetic-theory-resources/imitation-mirror-neurons/ [accessed 2023 Feb 22]. ↑

  5. Richard Gunderman , The manipulation of the American mind: Edward Bernays and the birth of public relations , The Conversation , July 9th 2015, in https://theconversation.com/the-manipulation-of-the-american-mind-edward-bernays-and-the-birth-of-public-relations-44393 [accessed 2023 Feb 27] ↑

  6. Diazzi, A., & Antonello, P. (2019). Introduction Intersubjectivity, Desire, and Mimetic Theory: René Girard and Psychoanalysis. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, 26, 1-8. Pages 4 and following. In https://www.academia.edu/78591031/Introduction_Intersubjectivity_Desire_and_Mimetic_Theory_Ren%C3%A9_Girard_and_Psychoanalysis [accessed 2023 Feb 22] ↑

  7. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, p. 10 ↑

  8. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum.pp 2. We say normally since Girard cites studies were animals perform homicide violence. ↑

  9. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York p. 10 ↑

  10. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York pp 33 and ss. ↑

  11. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York p. 3 ↑

  12. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York p. 34 ↑

  13. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum p. 156 and ss. ↑

  14. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, pages 9 and ss. ↑

  15. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum p. 51 and ss. ↑

  16. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum p. 19 ↑

  17. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, pp. 10 and ss. ↑

  18. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, pp. 163 and ss. ↑

  19. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, pp. 11 and ss. ↑

  20. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum pp. 4 and ss ↑

  21. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, p. 81. ↑

  22. Girard René, Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, p. 14 ↑

  23. Girard René, Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, p. 13 ↑

  24. Girard R. 2001. I see Satan fall like lightning. New York: Orbis Books. pp. 23/23 ↑

  25. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, p. 14 ↑

  26. Girard, R (1996). The Girard Reader, edited by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, p. 219 ↑

  27. For some Positive Law Schools the law no ground to be obeyed as long as it follows the correct rite of enactment, same as to be expected from a religious mandate… ↑

  28. Girard R. 2001. I see Satan fall like lightning. New York: Orbis Books, pp 7/13 ↑

  29. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, p. 22 and 24. ↑

  30. Girard R. 2001. I see Satan fall like lightning. New York: Orbis Books. ↑

  31. Girard, R. Violence and the Sacred. (2005). London New York: Continuum, p. 14 and ss. ↑